With the spread of wireless application, huge amount of data is generated every day. Thanks to its elasticity, machine learning is becoming a fundamental brick in this field, and many of applications are developed with the use of it and the several techniques that it offers. However, machine learning suffers on different problems and people that use it often are not aware of the possible threats. Often, an adversary tries to exploit these vulnerabilities in order to obtain benefits; because of this, adversarial machine learning is becoming wide studied in the scientific community. In this paper, we show state-of-the-art adversarial techniques and possible countermeasures, with the aim of warning people regarding sensible argument related to the machine learning.
INTRODUCTION
The last decade has been characterized by the widely use of smartphones, where the estimation of users just in the USA was 257.3 millions in 2018 [50] . Following this wave, Internet of Things devices become a reality (e.g., smart home, smartwatch), and according to recent studies, between 2012 and 2018 the Internet of Things (IoT) market has grown by 190 billion (U.S. Dollars) and reached 330 billion just in North America, where 2.3 billion of Internet of Things connections were estimated alone in 2018, with an expected growth to nearly 6 billion by 2025 [49] .
In this wireless device area, data science plays a fundamental role since the data generated by these devices are huge. Several applications have been developed and deployed in the real world, such as forest fire detection [58] , or traffic control prediction [33] .
However, machine learning suffers of several vulnerabilities and when an application is developed, security and privacy issues must Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. be taken into account. The failure of these applications can have a catastrophic effect; this is called "adversarial machine learning", where a malicious user tries to exploit machine learning vulnerabilities. We can just think to "autonomous car", where an object detection system is used and if an attacker can exploit its vulnerabilities, wrong objects could be wrongly detected on purpose (e.g., a stop traffic sign confused with a speed limit traffic sign). Moreover, nowadays machine learning is accessible to a vast target of people thanks to the many frameworks developed for Python for example (e.g., Scikit-Learn [43] , Keras [12] , Tensorflow [1] ) and people which use these tools may not be aware of the security aspects behind these approaches.
In this paper we summarize part of the several works that have been done in the research, by showing some of the several threats with some examples of attacks and possible countermeasures; we present these works grouped by the type of threat. In recent years, similar works tried to summarize the concepts of adversarial machine learning that we described in Section 3. For example, in [29] [10] [31] authors tried to describe in deep the aspects of the adversarial machine learning and similarly, others tried to focus on a specific application domain, such as text [54] .
The difference with our work is that here we try to explain and summarize in a few pages the major aspects related to the security of machine learning applications, while the previous works could be difficult for machine learning beginners or not experts in security aspects regarding machine learning. This paper is organized as following: Section 2: we show several machine learning approaches in the wireless area; Section 3: we introduce and summarize state-of-the-art attack on machine learning with the possible countermeasures; Section 4: introduction of state-of-the-art adversarial machine learning over wireless application; Section 5: discussion of possible threats over some of the applications described in Section 2 and we introduce ethical questions about the area.
The main contributions of this paper can be seen as: i) brief summary of famous state-of-the-art adversarial machine learning and ii) introduction of several challenges in the area.
MACHINE LEARNING IN WIRELESS APPLICATIONS
We define "Radio Frequency Applications", or "Wireless Applications", all those kind of applications which use radio signals in order to complete a task. In the world of wireless applications, there are a lot of devices, such as smartphones, or sensors (e.g., optical, acoustic, thermal, ...) which can be used in the IoT world. Sometimes these applications need the help of the machine learning, because of the huge amount of data generated, or just thanks to the elasticity of these approaches. In this section we will introduce some of the wireless areas in which machine learning is used.
Device Identification. In IoT for example, due to the increasing amount of devices from different brands, the challenge would be to identify a specific device based on its traffic [35] [36] . Similar techniques have been studied in [30] [55] ; the algorithms used for this task, in general, are Random Forrest, Support Vector Machine and Deep Learning techniques.
Compromised device identification. Following, we can find also work which try to fight the compromised device: Nguyen et al. proposed DÏOT, an approach that combines automated device-type identification with device-specific anomaly detection in order to detect possible attacks over the devices [38] ; here we find a k-Nearest Neighbors for the device identification and a Gated Recurrent Units for the anomaly detection.
Smart Cities. The aim of these applications, for example, are the optimization of the traffic in urban area, the reduction of congestion, the diminution of air pollution due to the bad traffic [33] [34] etc. Here, several approaches are used, from Random Forest to Sparse AutoEncoder.
Routing. With ML sensor networks can learn from previous experience, make optimal path and adapt dynamically to the environment; for example, we can find approaches based on a Kernel Linear Regression [21] or Q-Learning [3] .
Event Detection and Query Processing. ML is used for efficient event detection and it facilitates the query process (e.g., forest fire detection via Neural Network [58] ).
Localization and Object Detection. In wireless sensor often the signal could be noisy and traditional approaches have problems to deal with it; for example, in [46] a Neural Network is used, while in [57] a Support Vector Machine.
Traffic Analysis. The wireless signals can be used by a malicious user in order to exploit sensible information; the traffic generated by these sensors / applications can be analyzed. For example, in [2] authors attack the privacy of users in smart homes. In the survey proposed by Conti et al. [13] , authors exhaustively summarize stateof-the-art traffic analysis techniques; an example is given in [14] , where the authors try to understand user actions on mobile applications through the traffic generated by the device by the combination of Hierarchical Clustering and Decision Trees Classifier.
ADVERSARIAL MACHINE LEARNING
We can define a machine learning algorithm as a function F : X → Y that, given a sample x ∈ X, returns the corresponding y ∈ Y , where y could be discrete (classification problem), or continue (regression problem) variable. In the classification, the label given by a classifier is generally obtained by thresholding a continuous discriminant function G : X → R In this scenario, an adversary is a malicious user who wants to maximize his profit, by the alteration of the data sent to the model. The taxonomy of the attacks of machine learning algorithms has been discussed in [5] [23] [4] and it consists in 3 main keys:
• influence, which determines the influence grade of the attacker, and it could be: -causative attack: the attacker can modify the training data and influence the model's performance; -exploratory attack: the attacker try to infer information from the model;
• specificity, what the target of the attack is:
-targeted: on a specific point (or set of points); -indiscriminate: very general class of points, such as any false negative; this attack is more flexible; • security violation, which is the type of violation made:
-integrity: intrusion point classified as normal; -availability: large scale attack, with the aim of a degradation of the model's performances; -privacy violation: if the attacker can obtain sensible information (secrecy or privacy). The adversary's knowledge is an assumption that we must make in our hypothesis [6] ; this refers to the information that the attacker can have, for example the knowledge of the full training set (or partial), feature space, pre-processing techniques, model architecture or the trained model. In general, we can distinguish two main categories:
• black box attack: if the attacker has a limited knowledge about the targeted model; • white box attack: if the attacker has access to all the information that he wants. While the white box attack is not realistic, it can give us a measure of the worst case attack. However, related to this, we need to understand the level of freedom that an attacker has when he modifies the data [6] , and this could be:
• modification of the input data (limited/unlimited);
• modification of the feature vector (limited/unlimited).
Since machine learning algorithm can be used for sensible purposes, from self driving systems for the object recognition, to the spam detection, we should also think about defense line, or proactive protection mechanisms for preventing the impact of an adversarial attack [7] , and what we need is:
• find potential vulnerabilities before the adversary exploits the weaknesses; • investigate the impact of these vulnerabilities; • try to find some countermeasures to those attacks that can significantly impact the performance of our model. In the rest of this section we investigate possible state-of-theart approaches that highlight the weakness on machine learning algorithms and possible countermeasures.
Model Extraction
As previously mention, the knowledge of the adversary plays a fundamental role in the security of an application, where the less he knows about the target model, the better. However, sometimes protecting the model is not enough, since a malicious user can try to extract or steal the model by using the feedback that the target model can give. In this scenario, the adversary queries the target model F and, based on the feedback, he can build a substitute model F ′ . We can basically think that this could be a risk for all those ML applications which gives feedback to a user, with an API for example, authors sometimes provide services where the ML model is queried via API and here the API will return some information, such as a real values (regression) or labels / probabilities (classification); recently, this risk increased with the new ML platforms called MachineLearning-as-a-Service (MLaaS), where users pay for having a specific amount of queries; some famous examples are AmazonML from Amazon 1 , Google Cloud from Google 2 and Azure from Microsoft 3 , but also for those models deployed in devices (e.g., smartphone).
Attacks. Tramer et al. [52] proofed the extraction over several settings and different classifiers, by proposing an equation-solving attack for Logistic Regressions and Multilayer Perceptrons, and a decision tree path-finding attack for Decision Tree Classifiers. Other studies have been conducted by [41] [24] [53] .
Countermeasures. Limit the information returned by the APIs is a chance. For example, as discussed by [52] , MLaaS provides several decimals of precision: here, rounding the confidence could be a good idea, where the attack performs worst in all the cases; the suggestion is to reduce the amount of information that the model returns in the prediction, and in this way the attacker needs more queries in order to build a decent substitute model (the idea of rounding is given by [16] ). A similar approach is given by the use of deceptive perturbations, which is just a smart noise in the output probability that maintains the output class label [28] . Ensemble methods such as Random Forest, which returns a prediction based on the aggregation of the predictions generated by a set of models, could be more resilient to extraction attack. Juuti et al. proposed PRADA, an approach for detecting possible malicious patterns in a sequence of queries made by an user [24] .
Model Inversion Attacks and Leak of Information
Machine learning models often contain sensitive information related to the dataset and an adversary can exploit these information via both black box and white box attack (e.g., by using the confidence values). In our opinion this could be a huge threat, since not all the people that use ML are expert, and they might think that sharing a trained model does not compromise information of the training data.
Attacks. We can start with the work of Frederikson et al. [17] , where the study focused on a simple Linear Regression model used for clinical purposes; with the white box access to the model, authors try to infer patients genomic markers. Starting from this concept, in [16] the authors inferred sensible information using the confidence values over Decision Trees for lifestyle surveys and Neutral Networks for face recognition.
Countermeasures. As suggested for the model extraction, rounding the confidence of the model can mitigate this process in the black box scenario [16] (the MLaaS applications can be an example,
Evasion Attack
In the evasion context, the attacker's aim is to misclassify samples or to avoid the detection of a specific target class (e.g., spam, toxicity, malware, ...). In this scenario we need to understand the knowledge of the adversary, as described previously, which could be limited or perfect, and the capability of the modification of a single sample. This attack could be the direct consequence of the extraction model. Here, the attacker can modify the sample based on the feedback given by the target model, or the approximation obtained by the extraction attack.
Attacks. Evasion attacks are widely studied and discussed, and we can find examples over different architectures, from Logistic Regression to Deep Neural Network, and over different topics, such as image or text. Biaggio et al. investigated the evasion in a malware detection classifier and handwritten classifier (image classification, MNIST dataset [27] ) over SVM and Neural Networks and, using a gradient descent algorithm, they showed the feasibility of the attack [6] . Gröndahl et al. proofed this concept in the Hate Speech Detection (text classifiers), by adding errors in the hateful sentences and, with the addition of positive words, the successfully evade different classifiers (Logistic Regression and Deep Neural Networks) [19] ;Other works focused on the realization of this attack in the real world, by the evasion of state-of-the-art vision classifier 4 [25] and face recognition [47] .
Countermeasures. The countermeasure here is the ability to limit the amount of information that an attacker can have, and, since in general, the evasion is preceded by an exploratory phase. However, the use of adversarial examples in the training can mitigate the power of these attacks (adversarial machine learning), and, for example, the effectiveness of this countermeasure has been shown in [26] [18] [19] . Another approach is called Regioned-based classification [9] , tested over Deep Neural Network (DNN): the idea behind is that normal DNN are Point-based classifiers, which means that a normal classifier, given a sample, returns a label; vice-versa, with a regioned-based, the classifier will return a region, and the sample will be classified as the area of the obtained hyper-cube: this should increase the robustness of the model against adversarial examples.
Poisoning Attack
The success of machine learning is due to the good ability of adaptation of complex context with huge data (big-data problems); this property can be seen as a weak point for a malicious user, where he can create malicious samples that will be inserted in the training, with the result of poor performances [8] . Models are really sensible on the data used for training, and we can find examples in the real world where malicious data were used; a famous example is Tay, a Microsoft chat bot lunched on Twitter in 2016, which started to do offensive tweets 5 and it was shut down after just 16 hours. The aim of the chatbot was to answer to questions made by users. For giving an example, the chatbot started with innocents tweets, such as "hellllooooo world!!", and after few hours "should all die and burn in hell. ", while it was talking about feminists.
Attacks. Biaggio et al. studied the effect of poisoning over SVM [8] : here authors created poisoned example by the use of a gradient ascent algorithm (computed based on the properties of the SVM's optimal solution) and tested over the MNIST dataset [27] .
Countermeasures. Nelon et al. in the same work previously described (spam poisoning), studied the effect of two countermeasures [37] : i) RONI defence: in the Reject On Negative Impact defence we test the effect of the sample by measuring the impact of the model with and without it and, if the impact is negative, the sample will be rejected; ii) dynamic threshold defence: dynamically sets the spam filter's classification thresholds based on the data. Similar to the previous work of Nelson et al., an anomaly detection based approach has been proposed in [42] .
Trojan/backdoor attacks
A direct consequence of the poisoning attack is the back door attack (or trojan attack), where an adversary insert some backdoor triggers in the training set and use this triggers at inference time.
Attacks. "BadNets" are a class of neural networks studied by [20] : an adversary can create a model (neural network in this case) with state-of-the-art performance, but with bad behaviour on specific inputs.
Countermeasures. Avoiding the poisoning can mitigate this attack; however, the difficulties in the detection of this attack is that the behaviour occur only when the model is triggered. A possible defence is called "Activation Clustering" (AC), which, based on an analysis of Neural Network activations, try to detect poisoned trojan samples in the training [11] . In [32] authors proposed 2 techniques, with the assumption of a secure original training data: input anomaly detection, with a detection of those samples which don't follow the original distribution, or with a supervised retrain, where secure training samples might overwrite possible trojan in the network.
THREATS ON WIRELESS APPLICATIONS
While in the previous section we introduced some well-known adversary machine learning problems, here we give some examples of adversaries in the wireless applications.
For example, in the radio-signal classification, an adversary can produce a malicious perturbation that, added to a signal, it produces a wrong classification for whom analyze it. In [44] , Sadeghi and Larsson show the vulnerabilities of a Convolutional Neural Network [40] used for the radio signal modulation classification problem (GNU radio machine learning dataset [39] ) by applying Fast Gradient Method [18] . The adversary can think to use the poisoning technique, as described in [48] , where the attacker aim is to influence the spectrum sensing data collection by the transmitter, that after will be used for training a machine learning model: here, the adversary first uses an exploratory attack in order to understand how the transmitter decides, and after he can poison the spectrum in order to decrease the performances of the target model. End-to-end autoencoder communication systems can suffer to these vulnerabilities, as shown in [45] ; here, the authors performed a black-box attack over a DNN and they showed that classical end-to-end autoencoder systems are more robust.
Vice-versa, adversarial examples can be used also for good purposes, as described in [22] , where the noise perturbation was injected into the signal in order to evade the modulation detection based on DNN of a possible intruder.
CONSIDERATIONS & CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we first introduced some of the possible scenarios in which the machine learning can be applied in the wireless area and we continued by presenting some of the state-of-the-art threats in the machine learning field with the aim to warn people about these possibilities.
The emerging area of the adversarial machine learning is founding an important space in the world of the research; however, we believe that not a lot of effort is spent in founding threats over wireless application, while it is mainly discussed over images and text scenarios, for example.
In the previous section we discussed on some of the case-studies of adversarial machine learning in wireless applications, but it seems to us that these works cover only a small section of the wireless applications area. Let's do some examples of other applications: in the smart-house environment machine learning models can refine themselves in order to adapt to the costumers' behaviour; what if a malicious user start to query these kind of models in order to extract info from them? (threat to privacy). Or again, IoT is a world which is growing, and due to the new devices and new behaviours, the model may require a retrain after a while by using the new data collected; an adversary can think to poison these samples (poisoning and trojan).
Here we had some ideas on possible scenarios, but why the research in this area is underdeveloped? One point could be the leak of referent dataset. We can find these datasets for images, such as the MNIST [27] or ImageNet [15] , or in text, such as Wikidetox [56] for the detection of toxic comments.
We believe that these kind of dataset are fundamental for researchers for three reasons:
• they allow the reproducibility of the experiments;
• they allow a comparison with different techniques;
• they allow more researchers to study them: not everybody has the required resources for building their own dataset.
The growth of the research goes through this, since machine learning has a lot of benefits, but unfortunately it requires resources (e.g., memory, computational power, time, data), and sometimes these are a lot; this is a critical aspect since a lot of projects may will neither never see the light, since researchers could be discouraged from this. Some aspects here must to be taken into account: i) the possible applications are tons, and what we know is that some fields, like IoT, are young and in an assessment phase where a lot of devices are released every day and with them new applications. The simulation of these environments could be really difficult and it could require a lot of resources and time. ii) the privacy that sharing the data concerned, since these datasets may contain sensible information: for example, a social network could have difficulties to share data related to their users (e.g., name, surname, mail, phone, address, list of friends, etc.); these info could be used in order to detect if an account is fake or not but, however, sharing this info could be an attack to the users' privacy. Moreover, these data cannot be encrypted, since the information lost could be relevant for some aims (e.g., we cannot hide / encrypt the name of users, because the name could be used in the analysis for deciding if the account is fake or not). Related to this, experiments may be conducted in a simulated environment since the privacy violation of users could be a limit. Let's think about traffic analysis applications: it is clear that you cannot try to test your own idea at the expense of the privacy of other people.
Another aspect that we want to discuss, in the methodology of the machine learning pipeline, since the wide use of it (also non-expert of the discipline):
• data collection, where, as we explained few lines above, this step is crucial and it will influence all the following steps; every bias introduced here may affect the performance. For example Torralba and Efros studied this concept in the object recognition research [51] and here we summarize some of their consideration; for example, the cross-dataset generalization where, if our dataset is a truly representation of the real world, a model with good performances trained on it should maintain good performances over dataset in the same domain; the negative set bias is another important aspect: a dataset contains the "positive istances" (i.g., what we want to detect / classify), but also "negative istances" (i.g., what is not); this could be difficult to do, for example if we think about car detection in image classifiers, all the negative possibilities (not a car) are too much, and for this reason it is difficult to understand when the negative class is "good"; • the model selection, given the vast choice of available technique, we need to take and try the most fitting models; the choice must to be done based on the data and its representation, where we need to take into account also the properties of the models; for example, while Logistic Regressions or Decision Trees are simple and can be used with small dataset, Neural Networks and Deep Leaning architectures may require more data for having efficient performances; for example, in [19] authors compared different state-of-the-art techniques in the hate speech classification field, and they show that a Logistic Regression was good as a Recurrent Neural Network; • the metric evaluates the model performance; also here we can find several metrics, from accuracy to the F1 score with its variants; every metric try to capture and evaluate some aspects of your models. A wrong metric can compromise your work: let's consider a machine translator, which from a given text x, it will return a converted versionŷ and here we need to compareŷ with y (the real target) for understanding how well the conversion was; if we use the ratio of the correct predicted words, then the metric will look how many matches in the sentences we have (comparison the first word ofŷ with the first y and so on ...). However, suppose thatŷ is "Oh, it is great!" while y is "it is great!", the accuracy score will be 0 since there are no matches (because of the "oh", all the correct words are shifted); • the validation process: during the validation process our aim is to find the best model with the best hyperparameters; usually, the dataset is split in three sub-dataset: training set, validation set and test set; both validation set and test set must to be seen as a black box, which mean that we don't have any information about the samples. The training set is used for training the model, while the validation is used for its evaluation, and with this evaluation, the best hyperparameters are chosen. For a final evaluation, the test set will be used. Other techniques can help with this process, such as Cross Validation or Leave-One-Out Cross Validation.
Clearly, machine learning is a tool that must to be handled with caution and the concepts behind it could be really complex; because of this, adversarial machine learning can be really difficult, because the study of possible threats and countermeasures requires a very deep knowledge on the model(s) studied. Understanding "what is going on" in a model is the first step for the detection of possible weaknesses.
In conclusion, we believe that "adversarial machine learning" has good margins of improvement, and that in the following years huge steps can be done with the conjunction between the area of security and machine learning.
